Third-party judgment creditor appealed the order of the Superior Court of Butte County (California), granting petitioner wife and respondent husband preliminary injunctions, without sureties, that prohibited him from satisfying a judgment against petitioner by levying against certain community property until entry of a final judgment in the marital dissolution proceedings. Petitioner appealed an interlocutory judgment regarding economic issues.
Petitioner wife filed for divorce from respondent husband. While the case was pending, petitioner was sued and a judgment was entered against her in favor of a third-party judgment creditor. An interlocutory judgment regarding the property and support issues was entered in the divorce case and petitioner appealed. Capital punishment, also known as the death penalty, is a state-sanctioned practice of putting a person to death as a punishment for a crime. How Much Does the Death Penalty Cost in California? After the judgment creditor caused a community property savings account to be levied on by a writ of execution, petitioner and respondent each obtained preliminary injunctions prohibiting him from levying against certain community property stock or the savings account until a final judgment was entered in the divorce, but no bond was required. The judgment creditor appealed. In affirming in part, the court ruled that the trial court had authority, under Cal. Civil Code §§ 4351 and 4359 and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527, to issue pendente lite orders against any person to preserve the status quo of the marital estate. However, under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 529, the judgment creditor was entitled to sufficient sureties as a condition of the injunctions.
The orders were affirmed, in part, because the trial court had statutory authority to restrain a creditor of one spouse from executing on community property involved in the divorce proceedings. The orders were reversed, in part, and the case was remanded because the judgment creditor was entitled to sufficient sureties as a condition of the injunctions. The interlocutory judgment was reversed in an unpublished opinion.
HOLDINGS: -A trial court did not err in denying an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion filed by cross-defendants, an elderly couple’s son and his wife, that sought to strike certain allegations in a cross-complaint filed by the elderly couple’s financial planner for defamation and other causes of action because cross-defendants’ complaint to the Certified Financial Planners Board of Standards was not protected activity because the board was not a public agency and there was no public interest issue; -Cross-defendants’ communications to the financial planner’s employer, reporting his alleged wrongdoing, were not prelitigation communications that were absolutely privileged under Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b), and the anti-SLAPP statute, Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, because the communications did not suggest or propose litigation.